Corporate virtue in India
Financial Express, December 28, 2012
Corporate virtue in India
In previous columns, I discussed the concept of virtuous 
growth, which encompasses inclusive growth. Virtuous growth includes 
promoting fairness, but it also means avoiding societal change that 
corrupts and degrades positive human values. I discussed how virtuous 
growth might be promoted in practical terms, in the realms of governance
 and civil society. Here I want to discuss the role of business, 
specifically large firms that are India’s leading institutions of 
capitalism. What can and should their role be? 
One idea of virtue is that of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). This is fine as far as it goes, but it does not preclude a firm 
making large profits through unethical business behaviour and then 
allocating a small amount for superficial do-good efforts. Business 
tycoons also set up charitable foundations with their wealth, but, like 
CSR, these have no impact on the manner of doing business. The key 
desideratum is more ethical behaviour at the core of business practices.
One problem in effecting better business behaviour is that 
corruption is endemic in Indian society. The corruption scandals that 
are so common in government functioning also involve corruption by 
private sector firms. People in government demand bribes, and people in 
business supply them, in an unholy equilibrium. How can this equilibrium
 be changed? Kaushik Basu’s proposal to decriminalise bribe-giving (but 
not bribe-taking) focused on situations in which individuals are 
entitled to a government service but are forced to make illegal payments
 to receive it. At the Delhi Economics Conclave earlier this month, 
Avinash Dixit of Princeton offered a different focus and proposal for 
reducing corporate corruption.
If corporations need government approvals, or are competing for 
government as a client, they may pay bribes to avoid being at a 
competitive disadvantage if “everyone else is doing it.” Dixit proposes 
to address this problem through collective action mechanisms. In 
particular, he advocates self-regulation by the major industry 
associations, with clear codes of ethical conduct, explicit pledges, and
 mechanisms for punishing violations. The judicial system would have to 
create a framework for recognising such extra-judicial mechanisms, just 
as it does in the case of special arbitration. Existing examples of such
 institutions are university and military honour codes, and the workings
 of local associations to manage common pool resources (studying which 
earned Elinor Ostrom an Economics “Nobel”). Implementing such mechanisms
 is not easy, nor are they ever perfect, but they can work.
Dixit’s proposal is important as well as timely. Here I describe 
developments on the Indian institutional side, which complement his 
theoretical nuances. Interestingly, private sector bribery is not even a
 criminal offence in many cases. The government drafted a Bill in 2011, 
and it is circulating for comments. Major industry associations such as 
the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) have come out in support of 
the Bill. Changing the legal playing field is an important start to 
institutional reform, and complements Dixit’s ideas. Ideally, some of 
the practical monitoring and enforcement tasks would be assigned to an 
independent regulator, as they are in the US or UK.
Closer to Dixit’s idea is last year’s proposal by CII, of a Code 
of Business Ethics for its members. While the draft code is too vague 
and broad in many places, it is categorically against corruption, 
including all bribe-giving. BS Raghavan, in the Hindu Business Line, has
 made specific suggestions for increasing the specificity of the 
requirements of the code, and raising levels of transparency with 
respect to lobbying and influence activities. Dixit’s proposal would 
strengthen this effort even further, with sanctions against violators. 
It is surprising that there has not been more public debate on this 
effort, and discussion of how to get it right. In fact, none of the 
other major industry associations appears to have followed CII’s lead.
Also just a few months ago, the Global Compact Network India 
(GCNI), an arm of the United Nations Global Compact, released a report 
‘Raising the Bar Through Collective Action: Anti-Corruption Efforts in 
Action in India.’ The report release gained much attention, but there 
appears to have been no follow-up: the document is nowhere to be found 
on the Web. Press releases suggest that the report consists of a few 
case studies featuring transparency, monitoring and public standards of 
behaviour, together with advice for more collective action. Exactly!
In a sense, industry associations do not need GCNI’s report—they 
know what they have to do. But public debate has to push them into 
moving forward, to enshrine the ethical best practices that some of 
India’s iconic companies already have in place. In the short run, this 
will be difficult, as a critical mass of acceptance has to be reached. 
CII’s effort has broken the ice, and the other industry associations 
should follow its lead, or even leapfrog it, in creating and enforcing 
anti-corruption codes. In the long run, raising standards of corporate 
behaviour on this front will benefit those firms that can do well by 
being more efficient or innovative, not by bribing. This will enhance 
growth in the long run and make it politically more sustainable.
 
 
 
 
          
      
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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