Towards a strategic foreign policy for India
In my last column, on India’s ‘global
strategy’, I made several points. First, India should put economic
growth at the centre of its foreign policy. Second, it should pursue
knowledge and capital eclectically and vigorously from around the world,
to support this goal. Third, attention to infrastructure in
telecommunications, energy, roads, ports and airports is vital to
national security, beyond the obvious economic benefits. Fourth, China’s
rise is the main global strategic issue for India. In this column, I
want to develop the implications of these points for foreign policy in
practice.
I will begin with the last point, the implications of the rise of China. India has to deal with China in an accommodative way (there is no choice, given geography and history) but from a position of strength. Economic growth will not be sufficient to achieve this position of strength, especially in the short run. Therefore, to mitigate security risks, India has to engage in deeper strategic cooperation with other nations. Such cooperation goes beyond the conventional military dimension. On that front, the United States is almost the only game in town. A critical new front for strategic cooperation is information-sharing. Here, too, the US has enormous strengths, and a vital role to play, but there are other possible partners. Most such potentially valuable partners, however, have strategic ties to the US. The conclusion is inescapable that India has to deepen its strategic cooperation with the US. This is nothing like the Cold War world of treaties and alliances. It is about India assertively and systematically pursuing its interests in a framework of mutual benefit.
Is there a downside to closer strategic cooperation with the US? Will there be a cost because it offends China, or reduces India’s strategic autonomy? The answer must be ‘no’. Such cooperation strengthens India’s capabilities, especially if it focuses on learning (and it has more to learn than the US, in such cooperation). Will it provoke China? Not if it is done intelligently. And if the counter argument is that India should not seek to protect its security for fear of upsetting China, then that says that China is anyway reducing India’s strategic autonomy.
Given the necessity of strategic cooperation with the US, it becomes more important for India to seek economic ties more widely. Luckily, there are many alternatives here. In fact, barring higher education, information technology and some aspects of agriculture, US capabilities are not necessarily the best choices for India. To take a prominent example, US-style mass market retailing as it has evolved in the past decades may not be best suited to India’s geography and infrastructure. In renewable energy, mass transit, high-end engineering, consumer durables, mineral extraction and so on, Germany, Britain, Japan, South Korea, Australia and numerous other economies may have more to offer India in terms of knowledge bundled with investment. A diversity of economic ties acts as a counterweight to the narrowness of options for strategic cooperation.
To summarise, India has to integrate economic growth goals more clearly into foreign policy. Its diplomats should speak the language of commerce, and its business people should speak the language of the country they seek to do business in. (Wouldn’t it be wonderful if India invested heavily in foreign language training, not just for its superb diplomats, but also for its enterprising business people?) It has to pursue commercial engagement more actively across the globe. At the same time, India has to deepen strategic cooperation with the US, and existing strategic partners of the US. This is not about diplomatic treaties and grand alliances, but really about lower key information-sharing and security cooperation in all its modern forms.
Foreign policy is about pursuing national interests in the international arena. Sometimes, this means cooperating with other nations that have different political systems and values. Nixon famously went to China in pursuit of national interests, when China was still wedded to Maoism. But China wanted economic growth from that new engagement, and it succeeded. India has to deal with China, for many reasons, but not for reasons of strategic balance. India has little to offer China except resources, markets and acquiescence, and so is in a weak position. It has to strengthen that position.
Luckily, India has alternatives for strategic and economic cooperation with nations whose political values align well with India’s ideals. Even if shared values are not of importance in determining directions of international engagement, they are a useful bonus, as they enhance trust and cooperation. But ideals should not get in the way of national interests, and they should not be pushed on others. In any case, India has much to do on the domestic front before it can claim to be an international example of virtue. The bottom line remains that India’s government has to deliver greater material and non-material well-being for its citizens. Foreign policy is just one aspect of that larger challenge.
I will begin with the last point, the implications of the rise of China. India has to deal with China in an accommodative way (there is no choice, given geography and history) but from a position of strength. Economic growth will not be sufficient to achieve this position of strength, especially in the short run. Therefore, to mitigate security risks, India has to engage in deeper strategic cooperation with other nations. Such cooperation goes beyond the conventional military dimension. On that front, the United States is almost the only game in town. A critical new front for strategic cooperation is information-sharing. Here, too, the US has enormous strengths, and a vital role to play, but there are other possible partners. Most such potentially valuable partners, however, have strategic ties to the US. The conclusion is inescapable that India has to deepen its strategic cooperation with the US. This is nothing like the Cold War world of treaties and alliances. It is about India assertively and systematically pursuing its interests in a framework of mutual benefit.
Is there a downside to closer strategic cooperation with the US? Will there be a cost because it offends China, or reduces India’s strategic autonomy? The answer must be ‘no’. Such cooperation strengthens India’s capabilities, especially if it focuses on learning (and it has more to learn than the US, in such cooperation). Will it provoke China? Not if it is done intelligently. And if the counter argument is that India should not seek to protect its security for fear of upsetting China, then that says that China is anyway reducing India’s strategic autonomy.
Given the necessity of strategic cooperation with the US, it becomes more important for India to seek economic ties more widely. Luckily, there are many alternatives here. In fact, barring higher education, information technology and some aspects of agriculture, US capabilities are not necessarily the best choices for India. To take a prominent example, US-style mass market retailing as it has evolved in the past decades may not be best suited to India’s geography and infrastructure. In renewable energy, mass transit, high-end engineering, consumer durables, mineral extraction and so on, Germany, Britain, Japan, South Korea, Australia and numerous other economies may have more to offer India in terms of knowledge bundled with investment. A diversity of economic ties acts as a counterweight to the narrowness of options for strategic cooperation.
To summarise, India has to integrate economic growth goals more clearly into foreign policy. Its diplomats should speak the language of commerce, and its business people should speak the language of the country they seek to do business in. (Wouldn’t it be wonderful if India invested heavily in foreign language training, not just for its superb diplomats, but also for its enterprising business people?) It has to pursue commercial engagement more actively across the globe. At the same time, India has to deepen strategic cooperation with the US, and existing strategic partners of the US. This is not about diplomatic treaties and grand alliances, but really about lower key information-sharing and security cooperation in all its modern forms.
Foreign policy is about pursuing national interests in the international arena. Sometimes, this means cooperating with other nations that have different political systems and values. Nixon famously went to China in pursuit of national interests, when China was still wedded to Maoism. But China wanted economic growth from that new engagement, and it succeeded. India has to deal with China, for many reasons, but not for reasons of strategic balance. India has little to offer China except resources, markets and acquiescence, and so is in a weak position. It has to strengthen that position.
Luckily, India has alternatives for strategic and economic cooperation with nations whose political values align well with India’s ideals. Even if shared values are not of importance in determining directions of international engagement, they are a useful bonus, as they enhance trust and cooperation. But ideals should not get in the way of national interests, and they should not be pushed on others. In any case, India has much to do on the domestic front before it can claim to be an international example of virtue. The bottom line remains that India’s government has to deliver greater material and non-material well-being for its citizens. Foreign policy is just one aspect of that larger challenge.
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